Several decisions to make

National politics has been gripped by three major issues, two of which are interconnected and could be doomed to failure.
Debates have been raging both in and outside of parliament for months regarding the issues — charter amendment, referendums and an amnesty.
Parliament was recently at a crossroads when a special House committee presented its findings on whether a proposed amnesty — intended to absolve legal offenders motivated to act by political conscience — should be extended to cover offenders of Section 112 of the Criminal Code — the lese majeste law.
The committee spent months studying the possibility of extending coverage. While the panel found this to be feasible, technically and practically, resistance against an amnesty for Section 112 offenders was building fast within the coalition, to which the ruling party was highly perceptive.
Although Section 112 being incorporated in an amnesty stood to benefit former premier Thaksin Shinawatra — indicted on a lese majeste charge over comments he made to a South Korean newspaper — Pheu Thai could not see itself pushing for such “all-in” amnesty and expose itself to risks in the short term, according to a source familiar with the issue.
Besides, Thaksin’s trial could drag on for years through the three courts, and the former prime minister exudes confidence about his chances of acquittal. His trial looks almost certain to outlast the government led by his youngest daughter, Paetongtarn, who has less than three years left in office.
The study committee headed by PM’s Office Minister Chousak Sirinil, who is also Pheu Thai’s legal expert, was given a tough nut to crack — come up with a decisive recommendation on what an amnesty should cover.
Despite the panel’s repeated explanations and assurances its study was not legally binding and that it served merely to be a guideline for parliament to consider the amnesty issue, critics were unconvinced.
They argued the panel’s report carries enough weight to be cited as a reference for swaying the opinions of lawmakers.
They insisted also that a lese majeste charge is defamatory and therefore not a political, but criminal, offence. As such, it should be omitted from an amnesty.
The report could be a factor in legislating an amnesty bill, although it has been criticised as being inconclusive. The committee outlines three possible options — a full amnesty, conditional amnesty, or none at all — which has drawn mixed reactions from lawmakers from both the government and opposition camps.
Pheu Thai and the main opposition People’s Party (PP) have prepared their own versions of an amnesty bill, which are pending adoption and deliberation in parliament, in the name of national unity and reconciliation.
The critics said the study report was the precursor to political upheaval, calling it a ticket to condoning insults against the country’s highest institution.
In the end, the report’s appended “observation” containing the Section 112 offenders-inclusive clause was voted down by House members. However, the report’s principal offer of an amnesty for politically motivated criminal offenders was left intact.
With parliament currently in recess, the amnesty fiasco has been set aside for the time being.
When parliament reconvenes early next month, the government could be facing two more potential timebombs.
Equally, if not more eventful in its development than the amnesty tussle, is the controversial referendum method to be used as requisite for amending the constitution, long seen by many as undemocratic.
According to a source, how the referendum law is being reshaped could impact the charter’s “amenability”.
Efforts were mounted by the PP and Pheu Thai to do away with the double-majority rule which they dismissed as the biggest obstacle to achieving a referendum result.
The double majority refers to two conditions necessary before a referendum result can be considered binding under Section 13 of the Referendum Act. First, more than 50% of eligible voters must have participated in the referendum, and the majority of those who cast their votes must have approved it.
However, the rule has drawn criticism from politicians for setting the bar too high for referendums, making it challenging to meet the minimum threshold needed for approval and stalling much-needed charter reforms.
The House of Representatives may have thought abolishing the double majority requirement would be smooth sailing. It earlier managed to drop this rule and replaced it with a single majority, meaning that for a referendum to be adopted, it only requires more than half the ballots cast by voters who turn out.
As it turned out, the Senate stuck by the double majority method, reasoning referendums are held to decide national issues of utmost significance, so must be approved with a stronger mandate.
A joint House-Senate committee will be formed to iron out differences over the double majority rule, a job which could take up to six months. The timeframe is expected to delay charter amendment, possibly beyond the term of the current administration.
Over the past two weeks the government has repeatedly reassured Thais about the status of Koh Kut amid the 2001 memorandum of understanding (MoU) controversy, with Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra stressing that Cambodia’s version of the border map excludes the island.
Their repeated assurances have frustrated the MoU critics, who say that either the government is misreading public concerns about the controversial MoU or is trying to draw attention from the main issue.
Most Thais, if not all, have no doubts about Thailand’s sovereignty over Koh Kut; they are more focused on the transparency of the talks on managing maritime resources under the MoU signed during the administration led by Thaksin Shinawatra, Ms Paetongtarn’s father.
Suriyasai Katasila, a former coordinator of the yellow-shirt People’s Alliance for Democracy, said the critics’ focus is not Koh Kut but the claims about overlapping areas made by Cambodia for negotiations with Thailand over joint maritime resource sharing.
According to the critics, the MoU has resulted in 26,000 square kilometres of the Gulf of Thailand being recognised in the 2001 MoU as the overlapping claims area.
The best approach to this issue is to demand that Cambodia comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea before any negotiations.
Cambodia’s unilateral drawing of the continental shelf borderline in 1972 trespassed on Thailand’s territorial area, Exclusive Economic Zone and about half of Koh Kut, prompting Thailand to make a counterclaim in 1973.
Defending the MoU, Foreign Affairs Minister Maris Sangiampongsa said it provides a framework for negotiations on two maritime demarcations and economic benefits from the development of energy resources, known as the “indivisible package”.
He said the 2001 MoU has a strict safeguard clause in Article 5, stipulating that until an agreement on the maritime demarcation issue is completed, the MoU and any actions under it shall not affect the maritime claims of either country.
According to observers, calls for the government to revoke the controversial MoU are being made due to the close personal relationship between Thaksin Shinawatra and former Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen.
The closeness of their relationship and distrust toward Thaksin, widely seen as the de facto leader of the ruling Pheu Thai Party, have Thaksin’s critics worried that any agreement reached under this MoU could put personal interests above those of the nation.
Stithorn Thananithichot, director of the Office of Innovation for Democracy at the King Prajadhipok’s Institute, told the Bangkok Post that the current atmosphere is different from when the country was in dispute with Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple.
Although Thailand ultimately lost the temple to Cambodia, Thai experts in international law at the time stepped up to defend the nation’s interests, he noted.
This time, however, the issue has not been as widely debated by experts. Also, those commenting on the MoU provide conflicting information, making it difficult for people to judge which sources of information are credible.
“This has something to do with the nature of Thaksin and Hun Sen’s personal ties. When Thaksin was granted parole and told to stay at home early this year, Hun Sen was among the first guests to visit him,” said Mr Stithorn.
Olarn Thinbangtieo, a political science lecturer at Burapha University in Chon Buri, echoed Mr Stithorn’s views.
With Thaksin believed to wield influence over the ruling Pheu Thai Party, critics are sceptical about the independence of the Thai delegation in handling negotiations on issues involving national interests, he said.
Mr Olarn believes that Thaksin will be eager to see those in the government seize the opportunity to push for negotiations under the MoU as well as building a casino-entertainment complex during the Paetongtarn government, and if possible, the return of his fugitive sister Yingluck Shinawatra.
“If these core missions are accomplished, Thaksin will not have to worry about the next general election. He can bow out from politics because he will have reaped so much during Pheu Thai’s time in government,” he said.
The analyst also expressed disappointment with the main opposition People’s Party for failing to ask the government tough questions regarding the 2001 MoU and making the anti-MoU campaign weak.
The opposition party’s half-hearted efforts in keeping the Pheu Thai-led government in check are fuelling speculation that the two parties may have struck a secret deal where they can forge an alliance together in the future, he said.
“When the opposition fails to do its job or pulls its punches, it only adds weight to such speculation,” he added.